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UNUSED PUBLIC SENTIMENT.

Public sentiment is usually supposed to be something compact, well organized and clearly defined. The fact is that it is usually in a state just the opposite of this,—scattered, incoherent, making excuses for its own existence, and only brought into a united and vigorous force by the pressure of extraordinary circumstances or the overpowering persuasiveness of a few strong individualities. In none of the great historic movements for the uplifting of mankind has public sentiment crystallized and massed itself around a great principle until that principle had been championed by some fearless leaders or almost forced upon men by the providences of God. Then the accumulation and consolidation of public opinion has been swift and irresistible.

When the anti-slavery movement began back in the twenties it found but little open approval anywhere. But multitudes of men, at least—in the north, thought and sometimes said in whispers that the system was iniquitous and ought to be destroyed. But it seemed to the most of them impossible to do anything, and so they manufactured excuses for indifference and inactivity. But when the great struggle came and God made it impossible longer to dodge the question, they ranked themselves speedily and unequivocally against the monstrous system.

If the sentiment that already exists in civilized countries against the war system could be massed and well directed in wise plans for the overthrow of militarism, not another battle could ever be fought in any of these lands. To convince oneself that this is true it is only necessary to ply with a few questions chance-comers on the street, in churches, in public halls, and see what they will reply. "Oh, certainly. War is a great evil. Human beings ought not to fight and kill one another. A day will certainly come when such things must cease. We wish well to your cause; it is a very noble one. But please to excuse us. We are very busily engaged. Others can do the work so much better than we." That these men are right in their deeper convictions, there is little room to doubt. It is not opinion, sentiment, right judgment that is wanting, but courage, action. One of the great problems, in fact the only one, that now stares the peace movement in the face is how to bring this peace sentiment together, how to draw it out of its hiding places and render it brave and aggressive, instead of timid and faltering. When this is done, there will be no trouble in Parliaments and Cabinets. Legislators will be only too ready to incorporate into the statutes what public opinion

has already made law. Nations will vie with each other in hurrying up the establishment of international tribunals.

What shall we say of the moral responsibility of those men throughout the land who, convinced of the justness of the cause, temporize and hold aloof? What answer can they give at the bar of their own intellect and conscience? How can they utter with honor the names of Sumner and Bright, of Whittier and Lowell, of Hugo and Bonghi and Bajer, if they do not seek with all their strength to bring to practical realization the ideas which these men have cherished above all others?

Six men bound together, not by artificial pledges, but by conscientious conviction and unswerving fidelity to the principle which they hold in common, are worth more in the carrying forward of a good cause to its triumph than ten thousand men of right opinion who will not do anything. But what might we justly expect the strength of the movement to be if the ten thousand and more would simply do as they think?

THE REMNANTS OF THE DUEL.

At first view it might seem more fitting to say "The Revival of the Duel," but that would not be true, as the duel as a serious affair is virtually a thing of the past in civilized lands. In France, where the false notion of honor has lingered longest and with it the duel, there are a hundred encounters which are mere farces to one in which the combatants shoot or thrust with serious intent. These stupid, meaningless encounters (they would be more stupid if not meaningless) recently became so common that no attention was longer given to them. But suddenly the whole of France has been shocked by the death of a young officer of the army stabbed to death in one of these encounters. French journals are saying that the duel ought to be banished from civilized society; that for the most part these contests are without justification and are without serious intent; that the laws of the country against duels ought to be executed, and that the witnesses who arrange for the duels and are really responsible for them ought to be brought to justice.

But why all this outcry against the duel simply because a man has been killed? A nation that permits such an institution to exist in any form, looking on and allowing its citizens to meet one another, for any trifling offence, with deadly weapons, is really the responsible party in the case of the death of a duelist. The newspapers that keep still, while swords are whizzing and bullets whistling just "for fun," is *particeps criminis* when some one is killed. It is right of course to arrest the murdering duelist, as has been done in this case in France, but the witnesses ought all to be taken in hand also, and the officers of the law ought to use vigorous measures to stop

the occurrence of the almost daily meaningless encounters on French soil, which keep alive the false notion of honor and render respect for human life very small. The press, with its tremendous power in that country, could write all these senseless and inhuman challenges and "meetings of honor" out of existence in ten years or less, if it only got down to a right conception of the unreasonableness as well as the immorality of the thing, and of its own responsibility for the survival of the evil.

If M. de Morès was a murderer for having killed M. Mayer in this duel, M. Mayer was in spirit a murderer for having tried to kill M. de Morès and a suicide for having put himself into a position to be killed. The queer thing about it all is that these Frenchmen cannot see that a duel settles nothing with regard to honor. It may prove that the men are not cowards, in the ordinary sense of the word, but as to honor it proves nothing. The one who is killed or wounded or in any way gets the worst of it, is not changed one whit in reference to his character, unless perhaps his honor has gone down several points because of the fight. The same is true of the victor. It would seem as if a sensible look at the question would prevent any man of ordinary sense from being guilty of a thing so silly as to fight a duel.

The duel has passed through three stages. First, its existence under the laws. "If two neighbors," say the laws of Dagobert, "have a dispute about the borders of their possessions, let a piece of turf be taken up in the contested spot; let the two parties, while touching it with the points of their swords, call God to witness as to the justice of their claims; let them afterwards fight and let the victory decide the question of right." This is what is known in feudal history as the "judgment or decision of God." In the case of capital crimes the vanquished was dragged out on a hurdle *en chemise* and hanged, dead or alive, as a perjurer. Monks fought duels over religious disputes. Teamsters on the road fought duels with clubs. In the case of the nobility these duels were attended with great pomp and display. The second stage, was the prohibition of the duel. This was first done by Henry II, of France, who was very deeply grieved over the death in a duel of one of his favorites. During this second stage, the duel still continued, in spite of laws, to be a serious and deadly thing. Often no attempt was made to execute laws which might happen to exist against it. The third stage, through which the duel is now passing, is that in which public sentiment has in most civilized countries set itself strongly against the inhuman and barbarous custom and permitted it to exist, with rare exceptions, only in its make-believe form. It will doubtless linger a few decades longer in some of the countries of the old world where it still "runs in the blood," but we may hope that the combatants will be wise (?) enough to "fire in the air" or to remove with their foils only a little of the hairy scalp or better still to end the fray "with a breakfast."

THE HOMESTEAD CONFLICT.

Not since 1877, has the country been so stirred over a labor trouble as over that through which Homestead has just past. There have been almost at the same time other similar difficulties in other parts of the world which, but for the overshadowing seriousness of this one, would have attracted much attention. But all eyes have been turned towards the great Carnegie works, and millions upon millions of newspaper pages have daily carried the details of the conflict to almost every place in the land. The great public interest which has accompanied the events of each day has not been caused simply by the fact that there was a battle—a cruel, merciless battle, like all battles—in which a number of persons were killed and wounded, this lock-out strike, while resembling in certain phases all others, has been peculiar in several respects.

1. The men were not suffering from low wages, and did not really strike for an increase. Many of them were receiving pay, which from the standpoint of ordinary day-labor, seems surprisingly high. Workmen that earn from \$80 to \$150 per month, as a number of these did, do not strike for better wages simply.

2. The men were not of what are ordinarily called the ignorant and shiftless classes. Many of them had saved money and had built up homes for themselves. There were, of course, in the crowds on the day of the battle a number from the vagabond and criminal classes, but the leaders in the movement were skilled and intelligent workmen and property holders.

3. The trouble did not really spring from a proposed reduction of wages. The company had not said "we will give you so much and no more, and if you will not work for that you must quit." Not until after conference after conference between the company and the workmen had been held, was anything like this said.

What was, then, the real cause of the strike and lock-out? It seems that the deepest questions of the labor and capital problem are involved in the difficulty. It is not to our purpose to go into the details of the affair nor to say on which side the chief blame lay in this particular case. It would not be difficult to show that both sides have been seriously at fault at different stages of the trouble.

(a) The first cause of the strike is the wrong principle lying in the foundation of labor organizations. Men ought to keep themselves free to make engagements where they will, and if they associate, which is perfectly right, to help one another, it ought not to be on such a basis that thousands of men can be tyrannized over by others, or by a few more intelligent and headstrong leaders. Individual capitalists and laborers must be free to make contracts as individuals.

(b) The second cause of the difficulty is the increased